### 2NC—Overview [absurdly long]

#### What makes me me or you you? What makes the desk a desk and the laptop a tool?

#### “Being cyborg,” means tarrying with contradictions. Contradictions are not necessarily bad things, but they are usually interesting things. One of the most interesting is the structure of the Heidegger k. Heidegger says we should refuse technological thought and scientific rationality because they encode the world through a series of metaphysical boundaries that foreclose the possibility for authentic ontological experience that we get from dwelling in nature. The thing is that this criticism itself rests on a metaphysical boundary between the supposedly polar opposite worlds of “technology” and “authenticity,” or, in the language of the 1AC, between instrumentality and quote “asking a question of ontology.” This serves as the first of numerous philosophical oppositions underlying Heidegger’s project which they continue through the whole 2AC where they numerously say that humans have a special Dasein that animals somehow lack.

#### Far from being a radical post-humanist thinking, Heidegger’s project is one of metaphysical humanism par-excellence that invariably culminates in violence and genocide. We have a bunch of cards about how Heidegger’s thought repeatedly denigrates the figure of the animal. But, even if he didn’t we would win a couple of reasons why the pro-technology cyborg is a better starting point. Time to get pomo:

#### There is nothing original other than repetition. The whole quest for “authentic” experiences of being is misguided. Trying to find an “authentic” natural experience in the earth and soil can only lead to ultra conservatism and nazi-ism. The rootless cybernetic coded being IS the authentic one.

#### Difference is prior to identity. It is our relation to others that allow us to emerges as subjects. Mitsein isn’t just a fact of our throwness, it is what allows there to be an experience of being in the first place. As such dasein is structured around the obligation to others so ethics is prior to ontology and our cyborg blasphemy to the religion of “the self”/”the individual” is obligated by our debt to alterity. Derrida means we win this even if we lose the Levinas stuff: We can only experience being-towards-death through the death of the other of which animals and machines are the best example.

#### I am a collection of cells but I am also locus of relations. Part of being me is debating for YOU. Part of me is in my laptop and in the prompts from my partner. This is not the “Other” in the sense of division one. I am NOT my laptop. The other is not simply “part of me”. Rather, we are because we are with each other. I am not the same person without my evidence and my laptop is not mine without me. This is cyborg existence, and it is a mode of dwelling that the techno-phobia of the aff completely forecloses.

#### Non-human animals give us meaning also. And, it is jacked that we deny them pathos and ethics in farms and hunting ranges. If we win that Heideggerian philosophy denigrates non-humans (be they laptops or kittens) one iota you vote neg.

#### Undermining these dichotomies implicates the entirety of their project. Do not give weight to the aff’s philosophy claim.

Lawlor 07—Leonard Lawlor [is Faudree-Hardin Professor of Philosophy at The University of Memphis, author of a handful of books, and editor of a couple journals], "Animals Have No Hand” An Essay on Animality in Derrida, CR: The New Centennial Review 7.2 (2007) 43-69, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v007/7.2lawlor.html>

To approach this more sufﬁcient response, we are going to enter into some of Derrida's most difﬁcult but also most powerful argumentation. It is well known that all of Derrida's reﬂections on animality engage his reading of Heidegger, especially in "Heidegger's Hand (Geschlecht 2)." For Derrida, what always deﬁnes Heidegger's thinking (or, more precisely, what deﬁnes one of the voices of Heidegger's thinking) is the idea of gathering, Versammlung, rassemblement. As Derrida says: "gathering together (Versammlung) is always what Heidegger privileges" (1987c, 438; 1987b, 182). Thanks to this article, we shall see that Heidegger's claim, found in What is Called Thinking, that apes (and more generally animals) have no hand (and have no hand precisely in the singular) implies that they do not have access to gathering, and that means to the phenomenological "as such" (1987c, 355; 1987b, 173). And especially they have no access to the "as such" of death (Heidegger 1961, 51; 1968, 16; 1959, 90). The lack of access to death proper explains why, for Heidegger, animals cannot be the privileged beings by means of which [End Page 44] one is able to reopen the question of being. They do not question their own being. In contrast, as is well known, Dasein is able to question its own being since the possibility of death as such deﬁnes its proper being. Only from this possibility is it possible to reopen the question of being. To render the claim uncertain that we, as human existence, as Dasein, have access to the "as such" of death therefore will do nothing less than destabilize the entire transcendental architectonic structure of Being and Time. As Derrida says on the ﬁnal page of L'animal que donc je suis, "the stakes naturally—I'm not hiding this—are so radical that what is at issue is the 'ontological difference,' the 'question' of being, the whole structure of Heidegger's discourse" (2006, 219). The whole structure of Heidegger's thought is at stake when we make the separation between human existence and animal life uncertain.

### AT: Perm

#### There is nothing authentic other than repetition—no origin or root to find when our k is complete. There is no order to be found by the act of gathering—the act Heidegger denies to the “handless animal.” Our cyborg being is always a technological one, but so, necessarily, is the K of technology.

Lawlor ‘7—Leonard Lawlor [is Faudree-Hardin Professor of Philosophy at The University of Memphis, author of a handful of books, and editor of a couple journals], "Animals Have No Hand” An Essay on Animality in Derrida, CR: The New Centennial Review 7.2 (2007) 43-69, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v007/7.2lawlor.html>

At the beginning of any examination of the relationship between Derrida and Heidegger, it seems to me that it is very important to recall the following comment from "Heidegger's Hand": "For I [Derrida] never 'criticize' Heidegger without recalling that this can be done from other places in [Heidegger's] own text. His text could not be homogeneous and is written with two hands, at least" (1987c, 447; 1987b, 189). We must never forget, it seems to me, that Derrida's thought is always very close to that of Heidegger. In fact, I think that we have to say that Derrida's thought would not exist without that of Heidegger. Nevertheless, we also know that Derrida's thought is very far away from that of Heidegger. Let us accentuate this distance as Derrida himself has done in "Acts: The Meaning of a Given Word," at the end of Memoirs for Paul de Man. There, he lays out three "points" of an "Auseinandersetzung" (literally, a "setting over and against one another")—a "confrontation," as we say in English, between his own thought and, as he says, "a certain voice of Heidegger" (a phrase that makes us recall the heterogeneity of Heidegger's text) (1988, 134; 1986, 139). The three points are as follows. First, for Heidegger, the essence of technology and, by extension, rhetoric (Derrida has been speaking of de Man's understanding of rhetoric) is nothing technological or rhetorical. In contrast, for "deconstruction" (that is, Derrida's thought), the essence of technology and the thinking of this essence retain something technological; similarly, the thinking of rhetoric is not foreign to rhetoric. Not being foreign to one another, the opposition between technology, which is the accident, and the essence of technology becomes impossible. In deconstruction, there is always "parasitical contamination," and contamination always disturbs architectonic order. The second point also concerns architectonic order. So, second, Derrida claims that "memory without anteriority" cannot become a Heideggerian theme. Heidegger's text maintains an indispensable reference to "originarity." This point means that, in Heidegger, memory is [End Page 46] always a modiﬁcation or repetition of an origin, of a past that was present. In Derrida, however, memory is ﬁrst, which means that repetition (and therefore writing and technology) is ﬁrst: the memory not of a past present but the memory of a past that was never present. Any "originairism," outside of and sheltered from technology and writing, is, therefore to be deconstructed (1988, 136; 1986, 141). And then most importantly, we have the third point. According to Derrida, for Heidegger, the essence of memory resides in gathering.2 Gathering, in Heidegger, determines the logos and language through the idea of legein. The logos gathers into an "as such," into essence, into the unconcealment of truth in presence and nakedness, into simplicity and propriety. In contrast, in deconstruction, in Derrida's thought, there is no gathering that does not have a "nodal resistance" (1987d, 24; 1989b, 9). Gathering never reduces the "disjunctive difference" (1988, 136; 1986, 141); there is always dispersion, complexity, and impropriety. There is always violence. A different kind of logos violently prevents the gathering of the disjunction. To put this as simply as possible, it prohibits the gathering of the disjunction into presence, which means that something presents itself without any mediation right before my eyes right now, in the moment.

### Impact Comparison Cards

#### “Instrumentality” is not offense—it is inevitable. Only engaging the FACE of the animal solves

Haraway 08--Donna Haraway [professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz, PhD in Biology from Yale], “When Species Meet,” 2008, University of Minnesota Press, p 70 -72

It is important that the “shared conditions of work” in an experimental lab make us understand that entities with fully secured boundaries called possessive individuals (imagined as human or animal) are the wrong units for considering what is going on.3 That means not that a particular animal does not matter but that mattering is always inside connections that demand and enable response, not bare calculation or ranking. Response, of course, grows with the capacity to respond, that is, responsibility. Such a capacity can be shaped only in and for multidirectional relationships, in which always more than one responsive entity is in the process of becoming. That means that human beings are not uniquely obligated to and gifted with responsibility; animals as workers in labs, animals in all their worlds, are response-able in the same sense as people are; that is, responsibility is a relationship crafted in intra-action through which entities, subjects and objects, come into being.4 People and animals in labs are both subjects and objects to each other in ongoing intra-action. If this structure of material–semiotic relating breaks down or is not permitted to be born, then nothing but objectification and oppression remains. The parties in intra-action do not admit of preset taxonomic calculation; responders are themselves co-constituted in the responding and do not have in advance a proper checklist of properties. Further, the capacity to respond, and so to be responsible, should not be expected to take on symmetrical shapes and textures for all the parties. Response cannot emerge within relationships of self-similarity. Calculation, such as a risk–beneﬁt comparison weighted by taxonomic rank, suffices within relations of bounded self-similarity, such as humanism and its offspring. Answering to no checklist, response is always riskier than that. If an experimental lab becomes a scene only of calculation in relation to animals or people, that lab should be shut down. Minimizing cruelty, while necessary, is not enough; responsibility demands more than that. I am arguing that instrumental relations of people and animals are not themselves the root of turning animals (or people) into dead things, into machines whose reactions are of interest but who have no presence, no face, that demands recognition, caring, and shared pain. Instrumental intra-action itself is not the enemy; indeed, I will argue below that work, use, and instrumentality are intrinsic to bodily webbed mortal earthly being and becoming. Unidirectional relations of use, ruled by practices of calculation and self-sure of hierarchy, are quite another matter. Such self-satisﬁed calculation takes heart from the primary dual-ism that parses body one way and mind another. That dualism should have withered long ago in the light of feminist and many other criti- cisms, but the fantastic mind/body binary has proved remarkably resilient. Failing, indeed refusing, to come face-to-face with animals, I believe, is one of the reasons. We are in the midst of webbed existences, multiple beings in relationship, this animal, this sick child, this village, these herds, these labs, these neighborhoods in a city, these industries and economies, these ecologies linking natures and cultures without end. This is a ramifying tapestry of shared being/becoming among critters (including humans) in which living well, ﬂourishing, and being “polite” (political/ethical/in right relation) mean staying inside shared semiotic materiality, including the suffering inherent in unequal and ontologically multiple instrumental relationships. In that sense, experimental animal research is, or can be, necessary, indeed good, but it can never “legitimate” a relation to the suf- fering in purely regulatory or disengaged and unaﬀected ways. The in- teresting question, then, becomes, What might a responsible “sharing of suﬀering” look like in historically situated practices?

#### Technology reduces the world to the problem of coding—this is a radical move that has enormous power to redefine social relations

Haraway 91—Donna Haraway [Awesome philosopher with a Phd in biology], "A Cyborg Manifesto Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp.149-181. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/haraway/haraway-a-cyborg-manifesto.html>

Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies. These tools embody and enforce new social relations for women world-wide. Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as formalizations, i.e., as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions constituting them, but they should also be viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings. The boundary is permeable between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations and historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, myth and tool mutually constitute each other. Furthermore, communications sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common move — the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange.

### AT: Anthro

#### Cybernetics is not a “human” affair. A tree is a cybernetic organism defined by cycles of throw and decentralized control structures. The cyborg is all a round us, in coral reefs, insect nerve systems, and the feedback of dynamic (dis)equilibriums. DNA is textuality encoded through materiality—language without speakers.

#### Their ignorance of this is our science link—Heideggeriansm is not an escape of human hubris but a disavowal only of the technological. Science narrates a world that is radically alien and surprising. A world where human “uniqueness” is less important by the moment. Our radical science provides not mastery, but the revelation of its absence—the impossibility of total knowledge. It is a world that constantly surprises and wonders. Theirs is the politics of the ancient farmer, instrumentally mastering the soil with hand drawn plows and enfraiming all in anthropomorphic myths and chauvinist common sense.

#### Yes, our technological artifacts have cybernetic character. Just because they were created by people doesn’t make them embodiments of the human will. To think that it does is the height of protectionist metaphysics that posits being is determined by a beings creator. Have you ever really looked at a circuit board? Seen its complex designs, the sublime/beauty of its tiny curves? No one can understand or design a trillion transistor chip. Our machines surprise us, have corners we do not know. We live with Frankenstein’s monster and in so doing have become her. This is being cyborg.

#### Any risk we access relations with non-humans better means we win. Our responsibility to the Other is the very foundation of subjectivity itself, preceding questions of ontology

Pinchevski 1—Amit Pinchevski, PhD candidate in the Graduate Program in Communications at McGill University, Montreal, Diacritics 31.2, Summer 2001, p. 77

In order to reencounter the Other's side of the freedom to speak, it is necessary to recognize that the ontological structure of being-with is precisely what overshadows the Other's side of this practice. Levinas's contention is radical: one is first in relation with the Other and only later a self. Subjectivity is essentially response-able, or as Buber contends, the first word one says is "You" rather than "Me." The Other appears before the rise of the self, before its history, before the self is its own—the Other is "prehistorical," before the origin of the self. And before here does not merely refer to temporality. As Richard Cohen suggests, this ethical relation is better than being, better than ontology [8], better because it does not meet social structures, power, calculations, and reason on the same plane; it transcends and precedes them. The culs-de-sac to which the ontological situation of being-with the Other leads confront one with the realization that ethical relation comes before knowledge of what is: "The grounds for ethics cannot be found in the self's being; neither can they be found in the self's knowledge . . . [ethics] is secondary to nothing: neither to being, nor to the knowledge of being. It resides before and outside them" [Bauman, Effacing the Face 16]. I am therefore always already in communication with the Other; I am concerned with the Other before I am concerned with myself, I am a tympanum before I am a speaker, I am for-the-Other before I am for-myself. Thus, subjectivity is ethical: I am responsible not despite the fact that I have emerged as a self, but because I am a self. Responsibility for the Other—always as the ability to respond to his or her call—is the fundamental structure of subjectivity. Ethics comes second to nothing, not even to freedom, for I cannot will the freedom of the Other from my own freedom. If ethics, as described by Levinas, is indeed "First Philosophy," I am first responsible and only later free: The freedom of another could never begin in my freedom, that is, abide in the same present, be contemporary, be representable to me. The responsibility for the other cannot have begun with my commitment, in my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a "prior to every memory." . . . The responsibility for the other is the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the question "Where?" no longer holds. The time of the said and of essence there lets the pre-original saying be heard, answers to transcendence. [OBBE 10] The realm of ethical discourse is in the for-the-Other, in a realm beyond ontology, from which discourse reaches out to the Other. The realm of being for-the-Other is where speech breaks from its Ulyssian circle—it does not return to its origin; instead, it leaves its sender and is forbidden from returning and reinstating it. Speech here is already a response, an address free from rhetoric: it unfolds itself for-the-Other, and regardless of the actual content delivered, its first word is "Welcome."

### The Goddess is Dead

#### Our cyborg ontology is the only position that allows for POLITICAL PRAXIS to confront racism, sexism, or capitalist domination. Its not just that God is Dead—so is the Goddess. In a sense Lacan was right, there is no Woman, no Nature, just essentialist notions played for political purposes. These essences don’t hold up to a world where everything is becoming and coding. Power is engineering and resistance is reading. Heidegger’s conservative move can’t help us now.

Haraway 91—Donna Haraway [Awesome philosopher with a Phd in biology], "A Cyborg Manifesto Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp.149-181. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/haraway/haraway-a-cyborg-manifesto.html>

This list suggests several interesting things.13 First, the objects on the right-hand side cannot be coded as 'natural', a realization that subverts naturalistic coding for the left-hand side as well. We cannot go back ideologically or materially. It's not just that ‘god’ is dead; so is the 'goddess'. Or both are revivified in the worlds charged with microelectronic and biotechnological politics. In relation to objects like biotic components, one must not think in terms of essential properties, but in terms of design, boundary constraints, rates of flows, systems logics, costs of lowering constraints. Sexual reproduction is one kind of reproductive strategy among many, with costs and benefits as a function of the system environment. Ideologies of sexual reproduction can no longer reasonably call on notions of sex and sex role as organic aspects in natural objects like organisms and families. Such reasoning will be unmasked as irrational, and ironically corporate executives reading Playboy and anti-porn radical feminists will make strange bedfellows in jointly unmasking the irrationalism. Likewise for race, ideologies about human diversity have to be formulated in terms of frequencies of parameters, like blood groups or intelligence scores. It is 'irrational' to invoke concepts like primitive and civilized. For liberals and radicals, the search for integrated social systems gives way to a new practice called 'experimental ethnography' in which an organic object dissipates in attention to the play of writing. At the level of ideology, we see translations of racism and colonialism into languages of development and under-development, rates and constraints of modernization. Any objects or persons can be reasonably thought of in terms of disassembly and reassembly; no 'natural' architectures constrain system design. The financial districts in all the world's cities, as well as the export-processing and free-trade zones, proclaim this elementary fact of 'late capitalism'. The entire universe of objects that can be known scientifically must be formulated as problems in communications engineering (for the managers) or theories of the text (for those who would resist). Both are cyborg semiologies.